AETHER_01
About
AETHER_01 is an MCP (Model Context Protocol) server written in Rust that gives AI assistants full control over Windows 10/11 via standard input/output. From process management to GUI automation, from registry to WMI queries — everything a system administrator needs.
Details
- Author
- foursecondfivefour
- Categories
- Other, Infrastructure
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Method 4: Selective install with install.ps1
# Cursor only .\install.ps1 -Targets cursor # Claude Desktop + Windsurf .\install.ps1 -Targets claude,windsurf # Custom binary path .\install.ps1 -BinaryPath target\release\aether-mcp-server.exe # Specific release version .\install.ps1 -ReleaseTag v1.0.1
git clone https://github.com/foursecondfivefour/aether-mcp-server cd aether-mcp-server Copy-Item .env.example .env cargo build --release .\install.ps1 -BinaryPath target\release\aether-mcp-server.exe
Manual configuration (without install script)
{ "mcpServers": { "aether-01": { "command": "d:\\path\\to\\aether-mcp-server.exe", "env": { "RUST_LOG": "info" } } } }
{ "mcpServers": { "aether-01": { "command": "d:\\path\\to\\aether-mcp-server.exe", "env": { "RUST_LOG": "info" } } } }
{ "mcpServers": { "aether-01": { "command": "d:\\path\\to\\aether-mcp-server.exe", "env": { "RUST_LOG": "info" } } } }
{ "mcpServers": { "aether-01": { "command": "d:\\path\\to\\aether-mcp-server.exe", "env": { "RUST_LOG": "info" } } } }
After configuring, restart your editor. The MCP panel will show 10 AETHER_01 tools.
Dangerous operations aredisabled by defaultand enabled by the system administrator:
AETHER_BCD_EDIT=0 # Windows boot configuration editing AETHER_HAL_CONFIG=0 # HAL and memory dump configuration AETHER_OFFLINE_REGISTRY=0 # Offline registry hive mounting AETHER_DLL_INJECT=0 # DLL injection into processes AETHER_TOKEN_MANIPULATION=0 # Access token manipulation AETHER_LSA_SECRETS=0 # LSA secret reading
The only vulnerability is human error.AETHER_01 is a system administrator tool — likesudo,regedit, orservices.msc. If you enable all feature gates, disableforcechecks, and blindly execute AI commands — the server does exactly what you tell it. That's not a bug. That's the nature of an administrative tool. Full threat analysis:](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)SECURITY.md
Your computer (trusted environment) │ ├── Cursor / Claude / VS Code (AI client) ─── same user, same machine │ │ │ └── AETHER_01 (stdio subprocess) ← SERVER │ │ │ └── Windows API (system calls) — same machine, kernel │ └── Internet ← AETHER_01 has NO network access
AETHER_01 has no network access.It is a pure stdio process. It does not make HTTP requests, open ports, or listen for connections. All communication is through stdin/stdout with the local AI client.
- IETF draft: MCP Security Considerations— all tool parameters treated as untrusted (originate from LLM susceptible to prompt injection)
- OWASP LLM Top 10— LLM06 (Excessive Agency) mitigated viaforce: true+ feature gates; LLM02 (Insecure Output Handling) mitigated via parameter validation
- Anthropic MCP Security Best Practices— stdio transport (isolated), least privilege via gates, audit logging
AETHER_01 tool parameters come from an LLM that is susceptible to prompt injection. Therefore:
- Every string parameter is escapedbefore use in Win32 API
- No eval-like operations— cannot "execute arbitrary code" through a parameter
- No format stringsin Win32 API — parameters are never interpreted as code
- WMI WQL is escaped— single quotes in query strings are transformed
- Paths are canonicalized—..\..\windows\system32is normalized to a checkable path
Bottom line: if you don't enable feature gates without understanding them, don't disableforcechecks, and don't run the binary from an untrusted source — AETHER_01 is safe. Likesudoon Linux: a powerful tool requiring conscious use.
SECURITY.md— disclosure process, supported versions, supply chain audit.
- opt-level = 3(all LLVM optimizations)
- lto = true(fat LTO across all crates)
- codegen-units = 1(full dead code elimination)
- panic = "abort"(no unwind tables)
- strip = "symbols"(minimal binary)
- target-cpu = native(AVX2, BMI2, FMA, POPCNT)
src/ ├── main.rs # tokio::main, stdio transport ├── server.rs # AetherServer + tool_router ├── config.rs # FeatureGates from .env ├── error.rs # AetherError + FormatMessageW ├── audit.rs # Structured audit logging └── tools/ ├── process.rs # process_control ├── filesystem.rs # file_system ├── registry.rs # registry_editor ├── service.rs # service_manager ├── gui.rs # gui_automation ├── sysinfo.rs # system_info ├── network.rs # network_manager ├── user.rs # user_management ├── security.rs # security_audit └── automation.rs # system_automation
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AETHER_01 — Full-Spectrum Windows Management MCP Server
10 tools. 99% Windows coverage. Zero security compromises.
*= disabled by default, enabled via.envfeature gates.
AETHER_01 provides5 installation methods— pick the one that works best for you.
npm install -g @foursecondfivefour/aether-mcp-server
The postinstall script automatically downloads the latest Windows x64 binary from GitHub Releases and places it in your PATH.
Run this inPowerShell 7+ (Administrator):
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/foursecondfivefour/aether-mcp-server/main/install.ps1 | iex
- Downloads the latest AETHER_01 binary
- Creates.envwith safe default settings
- Registers the server inall detectedAI environments: Cursor, Claude Desktop, Windsurf, VS Code, and more
If your browser/GitHub client does not open the Cursor deeplink, copy this link into the address bar:
cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=aether-01&config=eyJjb21tYW5kIjoibnB4IiwiYXJncyI6WyIteSIsIkBmb3Vyc2Vjb25kZml2ZWZvdXIvYWV0aGVyLW1jcC1zZXJ2ZXIiXSwiZW52Ijp7IlJVU1RfTE9HIjoiaW5mbyJ9fQ==
Method 4: Selective install with install.ps1
# Cursor only .\install.ps1 -Targets cursor # Claude Desktop + Windsurf .\install.ps1 -Targets claude,windsurf # Custom binary path .\install.ps1 -BinaryPath target\release\aether-mcp-server.exe # Specific release version .\install.ps1 -ReleaseTag v1.0.1
git clone https://github.com/foursecondfivefour/aether-mcp-server cd aether-mcp-server Copy-Item .env.example .env cargo build --release .\install.ps1 -BinaryPath target\release\aether-mcp-server.exe
Manual configuration (without install script)
{ "mcpServers": { "aether-01": { "command": "d:\\path\\to\\aether-mcp-server.exe", "env": { "RUST_LOG": "info" } } } }
{ "mcpServers": { "aether-01": { "command": "d:\\path\\to\\aether-mcp-server.exe", "env": { "RUST_LOG": "info" } } } }
{ "mcpServers": { "aether-01": { "command": "d:\\path\\to\\aether-mcp-server.exe", "env": { "RUST_LOG": "info" } } } }
{ "mcpServers": { "aether-01": { "command": "d:\\path\\to\\aether-mcp-server.exe", "env": { "RUST_LOG": "info" } } } }
After configuring, restart your editor. The MCP panel will show 10 AETHER_01 tools.
Dangerous operations aredisabled by defaultand enabled by the system administrator:
AETHER_BCD_EDIT=0 # Windows boot configuration editing AETHER_HAL_CONFIG=0 # HAL and memory dump configuration AETHER_OFFLINE_REGISTRY=0 # Offline registry hive mounting AETHER_DLL_INJECT=0 # DLL injection into processes AETHER_TOKEN_MANIPULATION=0 # Access token manipulation AETHER_LSA_SECRETS=0 # LSA secret reading
The only vulnerability is human error.AETHER_01 is a system administrator tool — likesudo,regedit, orservices.msc. If you enable all feature gates, disableforcechecks, and blindly execute AI commands — the server does exactly what you tell it. That's not a bug. That's the nature of an administrative tool. Full threat analysis:SECURITY.md
Your computer (trusted environment) │ ├── Cursor / Claude / VS Code (AI client) ─── same user, same machine │ │ │ └── AETHER_01 (stdio subprocess) ← SERVER │ │ │ └── Windows API (system calls) — same machine, kernel │ └── Internet ← AETHER_01 has NO network access
AETHER_01 has no network access.It is a pure stdio process. It does not make HTTP requests, open ports, or listen for connections. All communication is through stdin/stdout with the local AI client.
- IETF draft: MCP Security Considerations— all tool parameters treated as untrusted (originate from LLM susceptible to prompt injection)
- OWASP LLM Top 10— LLM06 (Excessive Agency) mitigated viaforce: true+ feature gates; LLM02 (Insecure Output Handling) mitigated via parameter validation
- Anthropic MCP Security Best Practices— stdio transport (isolated), least privilege via gates, audit logging
AETHER_01 tool parameters come from an LLM that is susceptible to prompt injection. Therefore:
- Every string parameter is escapedbefore use in Win32 API
- No eval-like operations— cannot "execute arbitrary code" through a parameter
- No format stringsin Win32 API — parameters are never interpreted as code
- WMI WQL is escaped— single quotes in query strings are transformed
- Paths are canonicalized—..\..\windows\system32is normalized to a checkable path
Bottom line: if you don't enable feature gates without understanding them, don't disableforcechecks, and don't run the binary from an untrusted source — AETHER_01 is safe. Likesudoon Linux: a powerful tool requiring conscious use.
SECURITY.md— disclosure process, supported versions, supply chain audit.
- opt-level = 3(all LLVM optimizations)
- lto = true(fat LTO across all crates)
- codegen-units = 1(full dead code elimination)
- panic = "abort"(no unwind tables)
- strip = "symbols"(minimal binary)
- target-cpu = native(AVX2, BMI2, FMA, POPCNT)
src/ ├── main.rs # tokio::main, stdio transport ├── server.rs # AetherServer + tool_router ├── config.rs # FeatureGates from .env ├── error.rs # AetherError + FormatMessageW ├── audit.rs # Structured audit logging └── tools/ ├── process.rs # process_control ├── filesystem.rs # file_system ├── registry.rs # registry_editor ├── service.rs # service_manager ├── gui.rs # gui_automation ├── sysinfo.rs # system_info ├── network.rs # network_manager ├── user.rs # user_management ├── security.rs # security_audit └── automation.rs # system_automation
The Fabric MCP server exposes the following MCP tools that allow AI assistants to interact with your Equinix Fabric resources. Each tool corresponds to a specific Fabric API endpoint.
An unofficial and fully featured Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for the Action1 RMM REST API
Secure Zero-Trust SSH Gateway for AI Agents. A Go-based Model Context Protocol (MCP) server featuring runtime Regex Command Firewalls and multi-host isolation.
AI Agent Supply Chain Security - Intercepts and validates every package installation, git clone, and script download triggered by AI coding agents before it executes.
Model Context Protocol server for secure AsusWRT router administration via SSH. Provides 42+ read-only monitoring tools and guarded mutation tools for managing AsusWRT/Merlin routers.
Secure every MCP server with one governed gateway. Give each AI agent its own scoped MCP access, contain credentials at the gateway, and audit every MCP tool call without wiring agents directly to each server.
claw machine gives any agent access to the users local scoped docker socket.
A server for managing Counter-Strike 2 servers using the RCON protocol.
Monitor backup status and query Prometheus metrics from a Duplicacy exporter
This tool creates an MCP server to bridge the gap between AI workflows and EMBA security analysis.
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